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0: INTRODUCTION
Hume is widely  supposed to have argued – and even perhaps to have proved – that you can’t get an 
ought from an is, moral or evaluative conclusions from non-moral or ‘factual’ premises (T, 
3.1.1.27/469-70). Searle is supposed by some (not least by himself) to have proved otherwise, to 
have shown that it is at any rate possible to derive an evaluative – though not, perhaps, a moral – 
conclusion from purely “factual” or descriptive premises. The idea that such derivations are 
impossible is in Searle’s view a fallacy  – the Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy. (Searle ‘How to Derive 
“Ought” from “Is”’ 1964: 125)  Searle’s basic idea is that certain kinds of performative speech acts 
– such as saying ‘I will’ in the course of a properly constituted marriage service – involve 
undertaking duties or obligations. That the bride and the bridegroom are undertaking certain duties 
is analytic, at least in the sense that if you don’t understand at least roughly what the bride and the 
bridegroom are now supposed to do, you don’t  understand either the relevant speech-acts or the 
language-game in which they are embedded. Even a couple who go through the traditional marriage 
service – which, of course, includes the promise to forsake all others, keeping only unto thee – with 
the private and mutual reservation that theirs is to be an open marriage, do so in the knowledge that 
they  are privately cancelling one of the obligations that married couples usually undertake.  Thus to 
say that someone has performed a speech-act such as getting married, or making a promise – surely 
a factual, descriptive or empirical claim – entails that they have certain duties or obligations and 
thus, at  least prima facie, that there are certain things that they  ought to do.  More generally, human 
institutions have a normative dimension to them.  To understand the game of chess is to understand 
that if I put you in check, you ought to move your king, to block my attack or to take the attacking 
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piece. Thus it follows from the factual or descriptive claim that Carlsen has just checked Anand that 
Anand is obliged to move his king, to block the attack or to take the attacking piece. 
 I have several aims in this paper. To begin with, I want to insist on a distinction that Searle 
and his contemporaries generally failed to make: the distinction between the Logical Autonomy of 
Ethics and the Semantic Autonomy of Ethics.   Several versions of the Logical Autonomy of ethics 
are provable (and thus true) but none implies the Semantic Autonomy of Ethics, which is a much 
more debatable claim.  Secondly, I shall be arguing, as a subsidiary  thesis, that  Hume only 
subscribed to the Logical Autonomy of Ethics and that he was committed to claims which implicitly 
contradict Semantic Autonomy.  Thus Hume thought, or at least implied, that  with the aid of the 
relevant observations and explanations it is indeed possible to deduce an ought from an is, moral 
conclusions from “observations concerning human affairs”, though the deductions in question 
require analytic bridge principles that are, in fact, false.  If the Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy is indeed 
a fallacy, it is a fallacy that Hume did not commit.  Thirdly, I shall argue that Searle’s views are not 
incompatible with Logical Autonomy but only Semantic Autonomy, which is fortunate for him, 
since if they were incompatible with Logical Autonomy, they  would be provably false.  Fourthly, I 
shall argue that, in so far as Searle succeeds in deriving evaluative conclusions from factual or 
descriptive sentences, the conclusions are not genuinely moral.  The oughts in question are not 
moral or unqualified oughts. In so far as I can derive the conclusion that I ought to keep  a promise 
from a set of non-moral premises, the conclusion won’t be that I ought to keep the promise tout 
court, nor even that I ought to keep the promise other things being equal, but that other things being 
equal, I ought to keep the promise according to the rules of the promising game.  Similarly, in so far 
as the premise that Carlsen has just checked Anand implies that Anand ought to move his king, to 
block the attack or to take the attacking piece, it only implies that Anand ought to do one of these 
things according to the rules of chess.  Finally, Hume subscribed to analytic bridge principles that 
would license us to move from institutionally  qualified oughts (what you ought to do according to 
the rules of some institution) to moral oughts.  Indeed some parts of the Treatise can be read as an 
attempt to develop such deductions, though, as I contend (but do not argue at length), the analytic 
bridge principles required are all false.  
1: TWO TYPES OF AUTONOMY: LOGICAL AND SEMANTIC
Let’s start with the distinction between Logical and Semantic Autonomy. Consider the following 
inference F: 
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(1) Fritz is a bachelor; 
therefore 
(2) Fritz has no wife. 
Is this a valid argument? Well, in one sense ‘yes’ and in another sense ‘no’. It is not a logically valid 
argument, such that given its structure and whatever the meanings of the non-logical words, the 
premises cannot be true and the conclusion false. For there are many arguments with the same 
logical structure in which the conclusion is false but the premise is true. For example: 
(1) Obama is a Democrat; 
therefore 
(2) Obama has no trousers. 
But though the inference F is not logically valid it is analytically or materially valid, for given the 
meanings of “bachelor” and “wife” it is impossible for the premise “Fritz is a bachelor” to be true 
and the conclusion “Fritz has no wife” to be false. When a set of premises analytically entails a 
conclusion in this way, it  is generally possible to convert the inference into a logically  valid 
argument by  adding in an extra premise, namely an analytic bridge principle, true by definition, 
which expresses the meaning links between the original premises and the conclusion. Thus the 
analytically valid inference F can be reformulated as the logically valid F’: 
(1) Fritz is a bachelor; 
(1a) No bachelor has a wife; 
therefore 
(2) Fritz has no wife.
Now the distinction between formally and materially  valid arguments or between logical 
consequence and analytic entailment is not only rough and ready, but also, perhaps, a pragmatic 
one. For it depends on a prior partition of the vocabulary into logical symbols whose meaning is 
kept more or less constant in determining the consequence relation and non-logical or schematic 
terms whose interpretation is allowed to vary.  And where exactly  you draw the line is determined, 
in part, by pragmatic considerations.  Nonetheless, given such a partition, we can distinguish 
between logically or formally valid arguments and materially valid arguments.  Furthermore, this 
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was a distinction available to Hume, since it was implicit  in the teachings of his logic professor at 
Edinburgh, Colin Drummond. “How does the conclusion [of a valid syllogism] follow from the 
premises?” he asked his students rhetorically in a Latin that (from their copying errors) they were 
struggling to understand. Answer: “Not materially  but formally, since there is no new matter in the 
conclusion that is not in the premises, but the terms are merely arranged in a different 
way” (Drummond 1723?: 49-50).  Now, given this distinction (which goes back at  least to medieval 
times2), we can make a further distinction between two variants of Hume’s No-Ought-From-Is 
thesis – Logical Autonomy, the claim that that  there are no formally valid inferences from non-
moral premises to moral conclusions, that you can’t get moral conclusions from non-moral 
premises by logic alone, and Semantic Autonomy, the claim that there are no materially valid 
arguments from non-moral premises to moral conclusions, that you can’t get moral conclusions 
from non-moral premises with the aid of logic plus analytic bridge principles (because there are no 
such bridge principles). Now Logical Autonomy does not imply  Semantic Autonomy. If you can’t 
get moral conclusions from non-moral premises by logic alone it does not follow that you can’t get 
moral conclusions from non-moral premises by logic plus analytic bridge principles.  But Semantic 
Autonomy implies Logical Autonomy.  If you can’t get moral conclusions from non-moral premises 
by logic plus analytic bridge principles, a fortiori you can’t get  moral conclusions from non-moral 
premises by logic alone.  However the negation of Logical Autonomy implies the negation of 
Semantic Autonomy.  If you can get moral conclusions from non-moral premises by logic alone it 
follows a fortiori that you can get moral conclusions from non-moral premises with the aid of logic 
plus analytic bridge principles. Thus for anyone interested in the autonomy of or otherwise of 
ethics, Logical Autonomy comes first. 
 As I have argued elsewhere3, what Hume was insisting on in his famous Is/Ought passage was 
the Logical Autonomy of Ethics.  His argument depends upon the conservativeness of logic, the 
meta-logical principle, widely believed in the Eighteenth  Century, that  in a logically  valid argument 
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you can’t get out what you have not put in; more specifically, that there can be no matter or non-
logical content in the conclusion that is not contained in the premises.  As Prior pointed out (1960) 
this principle is (strictly speaking) false.  Fortunately for Hume, I have in my back-pocket a proof of 
a more sophisticated version of conservativness, namely that if there is non-logical content in the 
conclusion of a valid inference that does not appear in the premises that content suffers from 
inference-relative vacuity. (Pigden 1989.) This means that the novel expressions in the conclusion 
can be uniformly replaced salva validitate, that is, without prejudice to the validity of the resulting 
inference. (I keep  the proof in my back-pocket because it is rather short.)  So if “ought” is not 
treated as a logical word (perhaps an important proviso), you cannot logically derive a non-vacuous 
ought from an is, a substantively moral conclusion from non-moral premises. Logical Autonomy 
rises again (though in a slightly amended form)! Note, however, that  this tells us nothing 
whatsoever about the nature of morality since by the same token you can’t derive non-vacuous 
“hedgehog” conclusions from “hedgehog” free premises. No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is does not 
imply that there is any fundamental semantic divide between the non-moral and the moral or 
between fact  and value4.  It’s a meta-ethically neutral thesis. If there is such a divide other 
arguments are required to prove its existence. 
 However there is a problem. My argument only works with the proviso that “ought” is not (or 
should not be treated as) a logical symbol.  What if there are logical principles governing “ought” 
and related concepts, deontic “logics” that are genuine logics?   Even if there are such principles, it 
turns out that we can formulate and prove another version of Logical Autonomy. Gerhard Schurz 
accepts that some among a large range of deontic logics may be correct, and thus that it is possible 
to derive the theorems of (the correct) deontic logic from non-moral premises, a logical ought from 
an is.  But I have in my backpack Schurz’s proof of a different version of Logical Autonomy. (I 
keep  it in my backpack because it is very long and complicated5.) The idea is roughly this.  So long 
as a certain kind of analytic bridge principle for that operator is not included in the logic – formally 
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a principle that contains at least one schematic letter which has at  least  one occurrence within the 
scope of the deontic operator O and at least one occurrence outside the scope of any  O – then we 
can distinguish between arguments that derive moral conclusions from non-moral premises by 
deontic logic alone, and arguments that derive moral conclusions from non-moral premises with the 
aid of deontic logic plus analytic bridge-principles. Furthermore, we can show that if an ought-
operator occurs in the conclusion of a logically  valid argument but not in the premises, any 
predicate occurring in the scope of such an operator can be uniformly replaced with any other 
predicate of the same grammatical type salva validitate, that is without prejudice to the validity of 
the resulting inference. This means that if it  is possible to derive a partly moral conclusion A from 
non-moral premises D which includes a subformula saying that we ought to smite the godless, you 
can also derive parallel conclusions A’ and A’’ including corresponding subformulae saying 
respectively that we ought to smite the godly and that we ought not to smite the godless.  Thus you 
can’t get a substantively  moral ought from an is, that is an ought which tells you to do something as 
opposed to something else.  Does Schurz’s result support any meta-ethical conclusions, for instance 
non-cognitivism or expressivism?  I used to think so, but now I have changed my mind.  For 
Schurz’s result holds for all modal operators that are not characterized by bridge principles and only 
applies to “ought” in so far as it is such an operator. What Schurz shows is that for any modal logic 
L and for any modal operator M, so long as L is axiomatizable without bridge principles for M, then 
if M appears in the conclusion of an L-valid inference K ⊩L X but not in the premises, we can 
uniformly replace any predicate F occurring within the scope of M in X with any other same-placed 
predicate G salva validitate. Thus Schurz’s result holds for the belief operator B (“X believes that”) 
as well as the deontic operator O.  In deontic logics,  OA does not imply A and A does not imply 
OA.  So too with the logic of belief: “X believes that P” does not imply P nor does P imply  that X 
believes that P.  (Contrast the knowledge operator K and the necessity operator ⧠: Both Kp and ⧠p 
imply p.)  This means that a version of the “You don’t get out what you haven’t put in” principle 
holds for a wide class of modal operators M, of which the deontic operator O happens to be a 
member.  If there are no bridge principles applying to M, you cannot logically derive M-relevant 
conclusions from non-M premises.  Thus Schurz’s proof does not depend on any special features of 
the deontic ought apart from the fact that (in his opinion) it  should be construed as modal operator 
without bridge principles.  Hence, Schurz’s proof does not support expressivism or non-cognitivism 
about ought-claims unless it also supports expressivism about (for example) statements of belief.  
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2: AUTONOMY DENIED – LOGICAL OR SEMANTIC?
Searle takes himself to be contradicting Hume’s supposed claim that “no statement of fact by itself 
entails any statement of value” (Searle 1964: 120).  But he fails to distinguish between Logical and 
Semantic Autonomy, partly  because he fails to distinguish between logical consequence and 
analytic entailment.  Indeed, in the sixties debate, terms like “tautology” and “entails” were chucked 
around with a cheerful imprecision which is truly distressing to logically  sensitive souls such as 
myself.  Because Searle fails to distinguish between Logical and Semantic Autonomy he fails to ask 
himself which of the two claims he is trying to disprove.  Once you do ask the question, however, it 
becomes pretty  obvious that it the second thesis, Semantic Autonomy, that  he must have had in 
mind. Simplifying somewhat, his claim appears to be this: 
Thesis (A) 
“Smith promised to pay Jones $500”6 
analytically entails 
Thesis (B)  
“Smith ought /is obliged to pay Jones  $500”, 
with the possible aid of some ceteris paribus clause.  
It must be analytic entailment that he is thinking of since it  is obvious that (B) is not a logical 
consequence of (A).  For there are interpretations of the non-logical vocabulary  according to which 
(A) is true and (B) false.  Thus, in so far as Searle’s argument succeeds, it only refutes Semantic 
Autonomy: Logical Autonomy remains intact.  But does it succeed?  Are there analytic bridge 
principles that enable you to move from Thesis (A) to Thesis (B)?  To prove the point Searle has to 
come up with an analytic bridge principle (or a set of analytic bridge principles) K, such that (B) 
follows logically from K in conjunction with (A).  
 Looking back at the debate, we can see two lines of criticism of Searle’s “proof”: the Ceteris 
Paribus Critique (due to Thomson and Thomson)and the Promising Game Critique (due to Hare). 
Let’s take them in turn.
 
3: THE CETERIS PARIBUS CRITIQUE: THOMSON AND THOMSON
Nobody thinks that the fact that  you have made a promise analytically  entails that you ought to keep 
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it.  It is generally supposed that you ought not to keep a promise that it was wrong to make, and that 
other obligations can trump a promise, especially if the other obligations are morally  pressing and 
the promise is relatively trivial. Thus the bridge principle cannot be of the form: 
(K) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500, then Smith ought to pay Jones $500.
Rather, the bridge principle should be something like this: 
(K’) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and other things are equal, then Smith 
ought to pay Jones $500.
But the second conjunct in the antecedent, looks awfully like a moral proposition, since in order for 
other things to be equal, there would have to be nothing that might reasonably regarded as voiding 
or invalidating the promise (such as a prior promise to pay the $500 to somebody else) nor any 
obligation that might reasonably be regarded as trumping Smith’s duty  to pay up, such as the 
obligation to help  a needy relative who can only be saved from death or destitution by the gift of 
five hundred dollars.  Indeed, what (K’) really amounts to is this:  
(K’’) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and it is not the case that there is a 
factor F (from a range of factors M) such that given F it is not the case that Smith 
ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due), then Smith ought to pay 
Jones $500 (when the promise falls due).
But from 
(A) Smith promised to pay Jones $500
and
(K’’) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and it is not the case that  there is a 
factor F (from a range of factors M) such that given F it is not the case that  Smith 
ought to pay  Jones $500 (when the promise falls due), then Smith ought to pay 
Jones $500.
we cannot derive 
(B)  Smith ought to pay Jones  $500.
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To derive that conclusion we need the further, rather moral-looking premise:
(A#)  It is not the case that there is a factor F (from a range of factors M) such 
that given F it is not the case that Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the 
promise falls due).
But in that case we don’t really  have an Is/Ought inference.  For one of the premises required to 
derive (B) from (A) is not empirical or analytic but moral.  Hence Searle’s counterexample to NOFI 
is defused.  He has not succeeded in deriving a moral conclusion from entirely non-moral premises 
with the aid of analytic truths.  That, in a nutshell, is the Ceteris Paribus Critique of Thomson and 
Thomson in their well-known paper ‘How Not to Derive “Ought” from “Is”’ (1964).  But though 
Thomson and Thomson manage to defuse Searle’s counterexample to Semantic Autonomy, they fail 
to defuse his argument.  For what we can infer from (A) with the aid of (K’’) is this: 
(B#) If it  is not the case that there is a factor F (from a range of factors M) such 
that given F it is not the case that Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the 
promise falls due), then Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls 
due).
And (B#) is a non-trivial and authentically  moral conclusion.  It’s not a categorical ought of course, 
but neither are many authentically moral propositions. “You ought to obey the sovereign’s 
commands”, despite its categorical appearance, is really a conditional: “If the sovereign commands 
you to do something, then you ought to do it”.  But that does not mean that  it is not a contentious, 
and consequently, a substantive moral claim.  So too with (B#).  The fact that it is a conditional does 
not mean that it is not a substantive moral proposition. 
 
4: HARE, GODWIN AND THE PROMISING GAME CRITIQUE
But is (K’’) genuinely analytic?  A genuinely analytic truth is one that you cannot deny without 
manifesting either a misunderstanding of the words of which it is composed or a misunderstanding 
the language-game from which they derive their meaning.  But (K’’) is not a proposition of that 
kind.  If it is analytic, it  is analytic because it is a substitution instance of the following principle 
(which must itself be analytic):
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(K’’’) If a person P promises to X and it is not the case that there is a factor F (from a 
range of factors M) such that given F it is not the case that P ought to X (when the 
promise falls due), then P ought to X.
Is it possible to deny (K’’’) without manifesting a misunderstanding “promise” or the language-
game from which the word derives its meaning?  The answer, is obviously yes. For you can deny 
(K’’’) without manifesting either a misunderstanding of the word “promise” or a misunderstanding 
of the promising game itself, if you reject or condemn the institution of promising.  Hence (K”’) is 
not analytic.  And if (K’’’) is not analytic, (K’’) is not analytic either. 
 What do I mean by “rejecting the institution of promising” or “rejecting the promising 
game”?  You reject the promising game if it is a game you refuse to play or if you refuse to be 
bound by its rules.  More importantly for present purposes, you reject the promising game if you 
think that we are not in general obliged to keep  our promises, and that the institution of promising is 
a morally suspect affair.  (You don’t have to think that we should never keep your promises but you 
do have to think that we are not obliged to keep them simply because they are promises.)  This 
attitude is eccentric but not incoherent, and it is quite compatible with understanding the rules of 
the language-game that  you reject.  You can understand very well that according to the rules of the 
Promising Game you generally ought to keep  your promises whilst believing that in fact you have 
no obligation to do so.  This was, at least in theory, the attitude of Hume’s near contemporary, 
William Godwin (husband of Mary  Wollstonecraft and father of Mary Shelley) whose Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice was the radical-chic smash-hit of the early 1790s. 
What I have promised is either right, or wrong, or indifferent. There are few 
articles of human conduct that  fall under the latter class [a point which follows 
from Godwin’s act-consequentialism]. Omitting these, let  us then consider only 
the two preceding classes. ‘I have promised to do something just and right.’ 
This certainly I ought to perform. Why? Not because I promised, but because 
justice prescribes it. … If we discover any thing to be unjust, we ought to 
abstain from it, with whatever solemnity we have engaged for its perpetration 
[that is, whether or not  we have promised to do it]. We were erroneous and 
vicious when the promise was made; but this affords no sufficient reason for its 
performance. (Godwin, 1793, 3.3)
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Thus, according to Godwin, what we promise to do is either already  right (just) or already wrong 
(unjust).  If it already right, then we ought to do it whether we have promised to do it or not.  And if 
it is already wrong we ought not to do it whether we have promised to do it  or not. Either way, it is 
not the case that, generally speaking, we ought to keep our promises (that is, it is not the case that 
we are obliged to keep our promises unless there is something specific from a vague but not entirely 
open-ended range of moral factors that invalidates the obligation).  Thus Godwin denies (K’’’).  But 
weird though this is, it is abundantly clear from his discussion that  he not only understands the 
concept of a promise but is perfectly familiar with the Promising Game from which it is derived. 
Now if you can deny a purportedly analytic truth without manifesting a misunderstanding of either 
the words involved or the relevant language-games, then the “truth” in question is either not 
analytic or not true (and a fortiori not  analytic).  Hence, true or not, (K’’’) is not analytic. This is the 
good idea, lurking behind the prescriptivist rhetoric in Hare’s famous paper ‘The Promising 
Game’ (1964). 
5: WINCHELSEA, WELLINGTON AND THE DUELING GAME
What obscures the point for most of us is that we are in fact conscientious (if not enthusiastic) 
players of the Promising Game and which means that we subscribe to its rules.  But the non-
analytic nature of (K’’’) becomes clearer once we consider a parallel case where the game is no 
longer played. Consider the following derivation, which closely parallels Searle’s:
(1*a) The Earl of Winchelsea (a gentleman) publicly accused the Duke of 
Wellington (another gentleman, then serving as Prime Minister) of a policy of 
deliberate deception: “Under he cloak of some colored show of zeal for the 
Protestant religion” he is carrying on “an insidious design for the infringement 
of our liberties and the introduction of Popery”.  [Wellington was at that time 
endeavoring to pass Bill for Catholic Emancipation, giving Catholics in general 
civil rights and richer Catholics the vote, his reason being that this unplatable 
measure was necessary to prevent civil war in Ireland.] Lord Winchelsea 
declined to apologize for this insult. 
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(1*b) The Duke of Wellington called on Lord Winchelsea to give him “that 
satisfaction [for his conduct] which a gentleman has a right  to require and no 
gentleman ever refuses to give”. 
(2*) Wellington issued a valid challenge to a duel (from (1*b).)
(3*) Wellington placed Winchlesea under an obligation either to apologize to 
Wellington or to accept his challenge.
(4*) Winchelsea was under an obligation either to apologize to Wellington or 
to accept his challenge.
(5*) Thus Winchlesea ought either to have apologized to Wellington or to have 
accepted his challenge. [In fact he did both, apologizing after having fired into 
the air during the duel,  a practice known as “deloping”.7] 
Of course, even if we accept the rules of the Dueling Game, (2*) does not analytically entail (3*). 
Given these rules, Winchelsea would not have been obliged to fight or apologize if he had been 
blind, infirm or crippled (or if Wellington had been blind, infirm or crippled).  And there are no 
doubt other circumstances (such as being Wellington’s commanding officer whilst on active 
service) which would have relieved Winchelsea of the obligation to respond.  It would have been 
inappropriate for Wellington to issue a challenge or for ‘First Gentleman of Europe’ to respond, 
even if the First Gentleman had said publicly what he may perhaps have privately suspected that 
‘under he cloak of some colored show of zeal for the Protestant religion’ Wellington was carrying 
on ‘an insidious design for the infringement of our liberties and the introduction of Popery’  since 
the ‘First Gentleman’ was George IV and Wellington was his subject8. Nonetheless, the following 
thesis 
12
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8 Despite his Whig past, George IV was opposed to Catholic Emancipation and  had to be bullied into acquiescence by 
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(K*)  If after a public insult Wellington challenged Winchelsea to a duel and if it 
was not the case that there was a factor F (from a range of factors N) such that 
given F it was not the case that Winchelsea ought to have dueled or apologized, 
then Winchelsea ought to have dueled or apologized.
has the same kind of status as 
(K’’) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and it is not the case that there is a 
factor F (from a range of factors M) such that  given F it is not the case that 
Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due),  then Smith ought 
to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due).
And if (K*) is not analytic – as surely it  is not – then (K’’) is not analytic either.  (Though many 
approved of Wellington’s conduct in challenging Winchelsea, many did not, since they regarded the 
practice of dueling as a barbaric hangover from a bygone era9.)  Thus Searle’s Is/Ought inference is 
a failure, since the bridge principle on which it relies is not really analytic.  But though (K*) and 
K’’) are not analytic, the same cannot be said for their game-relative transforms (K*R) and (K’’R): 
(K*R)  If after a public insult  Wellington challenged Winchelsea to a duel and 
if it was not the case that there was a factor F (from a range of factors N) such 
that given F it was not the case that according to the rules of the Dueling Game 
Winchelsea ought to have dueled or apologized, then according to the rules of 
the Dueling Game Winchelsea ought to have dueled or apologized.
(K’’R) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and it is not the case that there is a 
factor F (from a range of factors M) such that according to the rules of the 
Promising Game given F it is not the case that Smith ought to pay Jones $500 
(when the promise falls due), then, according to the rules of the Promising 
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9 Appiah discusses the reaction at length. See Appiah 2010: 37-48. 
Game, Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due).
What (K*R) amounts to is the thesis that ceteris paribus, if a gentleman such as Winchlesea had 
insulted a gentleman such as Wellington and if Wellington had challenged Winchelsea to a duel then 
according to the rules of the Dueling Game Winchlesea ought to fought or to have apologized.  A 
person who doubted or disputed this claim would indeed show that they did not really understand 
the Dueling Game as it was (sometimes) played in the early Nineteenth Century, and thus that they 
did not really understand the relevant speech acts. What (K’’R) amounts to is the thesis that ceteris 
paribus, if Smith promises to pay Jones $500 then according to the rules of the Promising Game 
Smith ought to pay Jones $500.  A person who doubted or disputed this claim would indeed show 
that they did not really  understand the Promising Game as we play it today, and thus that they did 
not really understand the relevant vocabulary.  But you can accept (K*R) whilst being of the 
opinion that it is wrong to fight  duels or to coerce an apology under the threat of a duel just as you 
can you can accept (K’’R) whilst believing with Godwin that the Promising Game is a pernicious 
practice.  This was in effect the position of Godwin himself.  Here he is arguing that it  takes more 
courage to refuse a  challenge than it  does to accept and that a truly  honorable and courageous man 
will neither issue a challenge himself nor respond to a challenge on the part of somebody else:
If there be any meaning in courage, its first  ingredient must be the daring to speak 
the truth at all times, to all persons, and in every possible situation.  What is it but 
the want of courage that should prevent me from saying, "Sir, I ought to refuse 
your challenge. What I ought to do, that I dare do. Have I injured you? I will 
readily and without compulsion repair my injustice to the uttermost mite. Have 
you misconstrued me? State to me the particulars, and doubt not that what is true I 
will make appear to be true. Thus far I will go. But, though I should be branded 
for a coward by all mankind, I will not repair to a scene of deliberate murder. I 
will not do an act that I know to be flagitious . . ." He that  holds this language with 
a countenance in unison with his words, will never be suspected of acting from the 
impulse of fear (Godwin 1793: 2.2 App. 2.)
It is plain from Godwin’s polemic that he understands the rules of the Dueling Game – thus 
accepting (K*R) – but that  he is vehemently of the opinion that it  is wrong to comply with them.  It 
is one thing to understand the rules of a language-game and to accept propositions expressing those 
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rules.  It  is quite another to regard those rules as morally  obligatory and to accept propositions 
expressing such obligations.  You can’t derive moral duties from institutional obligations alone.
7: CONSENT, OBLIGATION AND THE SMOKE OF SEARLE’S CHIMNEYS
I’m obviously not the first to raise this kind of difficulty. For Searle considers the following 
objection: “[This] suggests the following reductio ad adsurdum [to my view]. On this account any 
institution could arbitrarily  obligate anyone depending on how one arbitrarily  decides to set up the 
institution.”  (Searle 1969: 262.) Now, it  is a common ploy for philosophers in a jam to invent a 
convenient conceptual truth to get themselves out of trouble, and this is just  what Searle does.  “The 
notion of an obligation is closely tied to the notion of accepting, acknowledging, recognizing 
undertaking etc obligations in such a way as to render the notion of an obligation an essentially 
contractual one”. Thus Wellington’s challenge cannot have laid Winchelsea under any  obligation to 
apologize or fight, since it is conceptually impossible to be under an obligation unless you have in 
some sense consented to it.  
 The dialectic goes like this. Searle says that it  is possible derive Smith’s duty to pay up from 
the premise that a promise has been made.  His opponents object that this can only  be a duty to pay 
up according to the rules of the Promising Game as it is possible by  parity of reasoning to derive a 
duty to fight (or apologize) from the premise that a challenge has been issued.  But it is absurd to 
suppose that the recipient of a challenge has a moral duty to fight (or apologize).  Hence the duty to 
fight (or apologize) is only a duty according to the rules of the Dueling Game.  The parallel 
conclusion holds in the promising case.   From the premise that a promise has been made we can 
only derive the conclusion that Smith ought to pay up according to the rules of the Promising 
Game.  To derive the conclusion that Smith is morally obliged to pay up, we need an extra premise. 
Searle replies by denying the parallel.  Since obligation implies consent  (an alleged conceptual 
truth) and Winchelsea has not consented, he is in no sense obliged to fight or apologize.  Since he is 
in no sense obliged to fight (or apologize) he cannot be obliged to fight (or apologize) according to 
the rules of the Dueling Game. Thus we need not conclude that  because the parallel argument only 
implies that Winchelsea is obliged to fight (or apologize to) Wellington according to the rules of the 
Dueling Game that Searle’s argument only implies that Smith is obliged to pay Jones according to 
the rules of the Promising Game.  My reply to Searle’s reply  is that the alleged conceptual truth on 
which he relies is in fact a convenient fiction. 
 As to whether it is conceptually impossible to be under an obligation that you have not in 
some sense consented to, I appeal, in Locke’s phrase, to any who have been but moderately 
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conversant in the history  of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. 
(Locke Essay:1.3.2.)  Think of the sad case of Orestes who was obliged to kill Clytemnestra 
(because she had murdered his father) and obliged not to kill her (since she was his mother). 
Neither of these obligations arose from consent.  Indeed, it worth quoting Hume himself in this 
connection. He is arguing against philosophers such as Locke who think that political obligations 
can only arise from consent: 
But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with 
nothing that, in the least, corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so refined 
and philosophical a system. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, 
who claim their subjects as their property, and assert their independent right of 
sovereignty, from conquest or succession. We find also, every where, subjects, 
who acknowledge this right in their prince, and suppose themselves born under 
obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the ties of 
reverence and duty to certain parents. These connexions are always conceived 
to be equally independent of our consent, in  PERSIA and CHINA; in 
FRANCE and SPAIN; and even in HOLLAND and ENGLAND, wherever the 
[contractarian] doctrines above-mentioned have not been carefully inculcated. 
(Hume ‘Of the Original Contract’  Essays, 1987: 470.)
Thus there is no tight conceptual connection between consent and obligation since many people 
throughout human history have conceived themselves to be obliged without having consented to the 
obligations. by  which they believed themselves to be bound.  Hence Searle’s counterargument fails. 
 
8: OUGHT/OUGHT INFERENCES: INSTITUTIONAL TO MORAL 
What extra premise would be required to derive something like the authentically  moral ought of 
(B#) from the non-moral (A) and the genuinely analytic (K’’R)?  Something like this. 
(OPG) We (morally) ought to obey the rules of the Promising Game.
This conveys the general idea the Promising Game is a good game to play  and that we ought to 
abide by  its rules, but to convert Searle’s argument into a logically valid deduction, we need 
something more specific:
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(OPG’) If according to the rules of the promising game Y ought to do X, then 
morally Y ought to do X. 
This gives us: 
(A) Smith promised to pay Jones $500
[Assumption.]
(K’’R) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and it is not the case that there is a 
factor F (from a range of factors M) such that according to the rules of the 
Promising Game given F it is not the case that Smith ought to pay Jones $500 
(when the promise falls due), then, according to the rules of the Promising 
Game, Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due). 
[Analytic Truth.]
(OPG’) If according to the rules of the promising game Y ought to do X, then 
morally Y ought to do X. [Assumption.]
(K’’^) If Smith promises to pay Jones $500 and it is not the case that there is a 
factor F (from a range of factors M) such that  given F according to the rules of 
the Promising Game it is not the case that Smith ought to pay  Jones $500 
(when the promise falls due),  then Smith morally ought to pay  Jones $500 
(when the promise falls due). [From (K’’R) and (OPG’).]
(B#^) If it is not the case that there is a factor F (from a range of factors M) 
such that given F according to the rules of the Promising Game it is not the 
case that Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due),  then 
Smith morally ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due).
[From A) and K’’^).]
(Ceteris paribus) It is not the case that there is a factor F (from a range of 
factors M) such that given F according to the rules of the Promising Game it is 
not the case that Smith ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due).
[Non-moral assumption, depending on (a) the rules of the Promising Game and 
(b) contingent matters of fact.]
(B) Smith morally ought to pay Jones $500 (when the promise falls due).
[From (B#^) and (Ceteris Paribus) resting on (A), (K’’R), (OPG’) and (Ceteris 
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Paribus).]  
This is a bit rough, but I take it  that it can be converted into a formally valid argument without too 
much trouble. But of course it is not an Is/Ought inference.  The problem lies with (OPG’) which 
obviously expresses a moral principle.  But perhaps we can get an Is/Ought inference by deriving 
(OPG) or (OPG’) from factual premises with the aid of analytic bridge principles?  
9: HUME’S OWN IS/OUGHT DEDUCTIONS: FROM FEELINGS TO DUTIES
Interestingly  enough, this is pretty much what Hume tries to do in Treatise 3.2.6. For Hume it is 
analytic that a trait is a virtue if it gives to a suitably qualified spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation. ‘The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality  is determined 
by sentiment. It defines [my italics] virtue to be whatever mental action or quality  gives to a 
spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary’. (EPM, App. 1.4.10/289).  It 
is likewise analytic we have an obligation to do – and hence ought to do – those actions whose 
neglect or nonperformance would displease us after a certain manner, (T, 3.2.5.4/517).  Now 
keeping promises is a practice which gives to suitably qualified spectators the pleasing sentiment 
of approbation (where being suitably qualified involves taking the general point of view and not 
being misled by factual error or the delusive glosses of false religion).  Indeed approbation persists 
or is intensified in those ideally qualified spectators who have had the origin and utility of 
promises explained to them by Hume.  (Once we understand the origins and function of this 
practice we approve of our tendencies to approve and disapprove. See Korsgaard 1996: Lecture 2.) 
Hence, fidelity to promises is a virtue.  Indeed we have an obligation to keep our promises since 
the neglect or non-performance of promises displeases us, giving rise to the sentiment of 
disapprobation (T, 3.2.6/516-525). Thus Hume deduces an ought – that we ought on the whole to 
keep  our promises – from factual observations concerning human affairs (specifically a set of facts 
about how we are inclined to feel, together with a speculative theory  which endeavours to explain 
those facts) with the aid of two supposedly analytic bridge principles.  But this is (OPG), the 
principle that has to be derived from facts if Searle’s argument is to work as an inference from non-
moral observations to authentically moral conclusions.  Of course, the fact that Hume relied on 
analytic bridge principles to deduce moral conclusions from observations concerning human affairs 
(and more specifically human feelings) does not prove that his deductions were a success. In my 
view they fail since the principles in question are not analytic. It is conceptually possible for an 
informed human spectator, taking the general point of view, to approve of non-virtues or to 
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disapprove of the neglect or non-performance of acts which ought not to be done10. But believing 
or presupposing analytic principles that are not really analytic is one of the ills that  philosophical 
flesh is heir to, and it is no surprise that not even David Hume is immune to this disease.
 
10: CONCLUSION
What is the upshot? Firstly, that Searle has not managed to provide a counterexample to Semantic 
Autonomy, since the bridging principles he requires are not  analytic.  There are analytic truths in the 
offing but they won’t  allow him to derive authentically  moral conclusions without the aid of a moral 
premise (OPG). Secondly, that Hume himself derives the moral premise that Searle requires from 
factual premises with the aid of a supposedly analytic bridge principle. Thus Hume did not 
subscribe to Semantic Autonomy.  Finally that these issues become a lot clearer if you make the 
necessary  distinctions.  To say that  you cannot derive moral conclusions from non-moral premises 
with the aid of logic alone is one thing: to say that you cannot derive moral conclusions from non-
moral premises with the aid of logic plus analytic bridge principles is quite another.  Hume believed 
the first but not the second.  Searle confused the two and failed to prove that either one is false. 
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10 See Pigden 2007, in which I criticize a similar set of principles due to another famous David, namely David Lewis. 
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